Gradations of guessing: Preliminary sketches and suggestions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2013
Abstract
Guessing is considered a central function of scientific inquiry by most scientists and philosophers, but it has mostly been neglected as an object of philosophical analysis. I supply an initial remedy to this neglect that provides a general definition of guessing that applies to scientific inquiry. In addition, I combat the assumption that the meaning of guessing is monosemic by providing examples of various types, or gradations, of guessing. The variation of these types indicates that guessing is not merely an unambiguous, simplistic process at which philosophers of science can merely hand-wave before moving on to deduction and induction. Rather, accounting for the gradations of guessing contributes to the argument that guessing is a logical process that is an appropriate object of philosophical analysis instead of a process that necessarily falls outside of rational reconstruction. As a logical process, guessing is clearly distinguished from induction and deduction. This distinction provides an important domain of philosophical inquiry that merits further investigation, especially within philosophy of science.
Recommended Citation
Tschaepe, M. (2013). Gradations of guessing: Preliminary sketches and suggestions. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.pvamu.edu/arts-and-science-facpubs/33