Reconsidering philosophical questions and neuroscientific answers: Two pillars of inquiry
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-1-2013
Abstract
I propose the next steps in the neuropragmatic approach to philosophy that has been advocated by Solymosi and Shook (2013). My focus is the initial process of inquiry implicit in addressing philosophical questions of cognition and mind by utilizing the tools of neuroscientific research. I combine John Dewey's pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce's three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. My goal is to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. First, I outline Dewey's pattern of inquiry, highlighting the initial problematic phase in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiate the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce's three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence. © 2013 Versita Warsaw and Springer-Verlag Wien.
Recommended Citation
Tschaepe, M. (2013). Reconsidering philosophical questions and neuroscientific answers: Two pillars of inquiry. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.pvamu.edu/arts-and-science-facpubs/31